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Abstract
This paper studies the factors that can generate the puzzling saving phenomenon
in the US: 1) Starr-McCluer (1996) finds that households covered by private health
insurance save more than comparable households without coverage, even when
controlling for other variables. 2) The asset holding ratio of the insured to the unin-
sured decreases with increased income level. This paper suggests that institutional
factors, in particular, a means-tested social welfare system and an employment-
based health insurance system, can account for the phenomenon. I develop a dy-
namic equilibrium model, and show that the model economy presents the same sav-
ing pattern as in the US and that the empirical finding as in Starr-McCluer (1996)
is replicated. Implications for empirical approaches to testing the precautionary
saving hypothesis are also provided.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides both qualitative and quantitative analyses to study the factors that
can generate a puzzling pattern of household saving observed in the US data. Theoreti-
cally, an introduction of insurance, which moderates households’ income or expenditure
uncertainties, is expected to reduce their precautionary savings.1 Starr-McCluer (1996)
reported a phenomenon of household savings in the US that is puzzling from the van-
tage point of the standard precautionary saving model: households covered by private
health insurance save more than comparable households without coverage. Even when
applying econometric methods to control for other household characteristics, includ-
ing “selectivity”, Starr-McCluer still found a significant and positive effect of health
insurance coverage on household asset holdings.2 In addition, It is observed that the
difference in asset holdings between insured and uninsured households decreases with
increased income level. The ratio of median asset holdings of the insured to the unin-
sured is much greater than one in low income groups. The ratio decreases as income
increases and becomes close to one in the top income group.3 The main purposes of
this paper are: 1) providing a theoretical explanation to the above findings and a model
can quantitatively present the saving behavior differences between the insured and the
uninsured households with different income levels; 2) performing empirical tests as in
Starr-McCluer’s paper in the model economy that can replicate her results.
Starr-McCluer suggests that selectivity might not play a main role with this phe-
nomenon, and there is no further analysis of this puzzling saving pattern provided in
the existing literature.4 Rather than appealing to selectivity, which depends greatly on
the setting of individual preferences, as an explanatory factor, I suggest that two US
institutions can account for this puzzling phenomenon: the asset-based means-tested
1This is also known as the precautionary saving hypothesis. Aiyagari (1994) presents qualitative and
quantitative analyses of the impact of uninsured idiosyncratic risk on individual and aggregate saving. Be-
cause health care has been a large portion of individual expenditure, Kotlikoff (1989) and Hubbard et al.
(1995) suggest that the uncertainty of medical expenditure has significant effects on household saving be-
havior. De Nardi et al. (2006), using data from Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD)
to estimate a life-cycle model, have shown the importance of medical expenditure shocks for savings of the
elderly.
2“Selectivity” means that people have heterogeneous risk aversion, and people who are more risk-averse
may tend to save more and also buy health insurance.
3The details will be discussed in section 2.
4Guariglia and Rossi (2004), for example, use UK data and find results similar to Starr-McCluer. How-
ever, others, for example, Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), Chuo et al. (2003, 2004), and Maynard and Qiu
(2005) use different types of health insurance to test the precautionary saving and prevent controlling selec-
tivity.
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social welfare system and the employment-based health insurance system. I show that,
in a standard model incorporating these two institutions, although health insurance has
a negative effect on precautionary saving, it also has a positive saving effect because
of the presence of the two institutions. The observable net effect on savings is conse-
quently ambiguous. The quantitative analysis in this paper shows that if an economy has
a sizable means-tested social welfare system and an employment-based health insurance
system, as does the US economy, the simulated household insurance-saving pattern will
be very close to that observed in the US data. This finding explains the puzzling phe-
nomenon, and calls into question the appropriateness of empirical approaches to testing
the precautionary saving hypothesis through the effect of health insurance.5 I show
that even if we can control adequately for all household characteristics, the regressions
capture the net saving effect of health insurance rather than exclusively the effect on
precautionary saving.
Previous studies have discussed the effects of asset-based means-tested social wel-
fare program on savings. The social welfare system provides financial support for house-
holds in bad times and this reduces precautionary savings. In addition, the asset-based
means testing creates an incentive for households to reduce savings in order to qualify
for social welfare benefits.6 This paper further explores the interaction between health
insurance coverage and the social welfare system and examines how this interaction af-
fects household savings. As in the standard model, health insurance still has a negative
effect on precautionary saving. However, because health insurance coverage will de-
crease the probability that households will qualify for the means-tested social welfare
programs and the expected benefits of the social welfare programs, it will reduce the
negative saving effect caused by the social welfare system, which amounts to a positive
effect on saving. Therefore, the net effect of health insurance is ambiguous. I show
that, if the means-tested social welfare system is sizable (in a reasonable range), the net
saving effect of health insurance will be positive for households with lower income.7
The employment-based health insurance system also plays an important role to ex-
5The common approach is regressing household savings on health insurance status and controlling for
other household characteristics. A significant and negative coefficient of health insurance implies that the
precautionary saving hypothesis holds.
6Hubbard et al. (1995) provide a theoretical analysis and suggest that this kind of means-tested social
welfare program can depress savings and explain why many American households hold very few or even
no assets. Some recent empirical studies have confirmed their analysis, for example, Powers(1998), Gruber
and Yelowitz (1999) and Maynard and Qiu (2005).
7It does not mean that precautionary savings will be more. They might still reduce their precautionary
savings because of lower risk, but the asset return is higher now since the health insurance makes the social
welfare programs less influential. The net level of savings could be higher.
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plain the saving behaviors. Previous studies have discussed the features of employment-
based health insurance (see McGarry, 2002), but few have explored its effects on saving.
One feature of this health insurance system is that when people work full time in good
positions (usually in bigger companies), they and their families usually have health in-
surance coverage provided by employers; however, when people lose their jobs, change
to part-time jobs or move to worse positions (usually in smaller companies) and do not
qualify for public health insurance programs, they usually become uninsured.8 Given
that health insurance coverage is highly contingent on work status, insurance coverage is
also uncertain, so households that are currently insured will save against the possibility
that they will encounter bad times in the future when they are not insured. This channel
further strengthens the positive saving effect of health insurance.9
In addition, because both the means-tested social welfare system and health insur-
ance have smaller effects on high-income households, their saving behavior will not
change as much as that of low-income households when health insurance coverage is
received. The difference in asset holdings between insured and uninsured households
in high-income groups will, therefore, be smaller than the difference in low-income
groups. This explains the insurance-saving pattern across income levels observed in the
US data.
To analyze this issue comprehensively, I herein develop a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with infinitely-lived risk-averse households who are ex ante identical
and heterogenous after idiosyncratic income and medical expenditure risks are realized.
Unlike in a life-cycle model, there are many factors that together affect saving deci-
sions, for example, lifetime income distribution, retirement, death, bequest, and pre-
caution against future uncertainty; in this model, the main reason for saving, besides
8The main reason for this feature is that for workers (and the unemployed) without employment-based
health insurance who are not qualified for public insurance programs, the only option to access health
insurance is individual (non-group) health insurance, which is much more expensive than employment-
based (group) health insurance. Many people are even turned down for coverage because they can not meet
certain conditions. For example, people who are 40 years old or older are often turned down (Swartz, 2003).
The high premiums and lack of access of individual health insurance are caused by many factors, such as
higher administration costs, higher advertisement costs, and adverse selection problems in the individual
health insurance market (see the discussion in McGarry, 2002 and Swartz, 2003). In the US data, we
observe that about 90% of private health insurance is employment-based and that most of those without
employment-based insurance coverage and who do not qualify for public health insurance programs are
uninsured. See McGarry (2002) for more detailed information.
9Because currently-insured households usually have higher current income, this situation further lowers
insured households’ expected benefits from the means-tested social welfare system, and then further in-
creases their savings; on the other hand, the currently uninsured usually have lower income, and this raises
their expected benefits from the social welfare system, and then further reduces their savings.
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accumulating capital, is precaution against uncertainty. One goal of this paper is to an-
swer the question “if people do have precautionary motives and other variables are well
controlled, why is their saving behavior under insurance coverage so different from the
expectation under a standard model?” This simple model shows the reason clearly, and
prevents complex analysis across many different factors that affect saving, and thereby
avoids the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of precautionary saving from the effects
of other factors.
The two institutions are incorporated in the model. Because the asset markets are
incomplete (i.e. households are borrowing constrained), households have an incentive
to accumulate assets against the uncertainty.10 Without the addition of the two institu-
tions, this model will present the features as in a standard precautionary saving model:
households save in a precautionary manner, and the introduction of health insurance
will reduce savings. However, I show that in the presence of the two institutions, the net
saving effect of health insurance is reversed for households in some income groups. My
quantitative analysis shows that when the model is calibrated to match the US economy,
the simulated household insurance-saving pattern will be very close to that observed in
the US data.
The above findings call into question the appropriateness of empirical approaches
for testing the precautionary saving hypothesis that are based on the standard precau-
tionary saving model. The basic idea of these approaches is regressing savings/asset
holdings on health insurance coverage and controlling for other household characteris-
tics to estimate the saving equation. I suggest that, in an economy with a means-tested
and social welfare system and a work-contingent health insurance system, this kind of
empirical approach might easily lead one to conclude that health insurance has a positive
effect on savings and to reject the hypothesis of precautionary saving. This is because
the regression captures the net saving effect of health insurance, rather than exclusively
the effect on precautionary saving. I also apply this regression approach in the model
economy. Although households do have precautionary saving motives by construction,
the regression result shows a significant and positive saving effect of health insurance
coverage, which leads to a rejection of the precautionary saving hypothesis. I also sug-
gest that if we can observe an economy that is experiencing regime changes in its social
welfare system and health insurance system, we will be able to identify these combined
effects separately. However, if these data are unavailable, developing an adequate ap-
proach to examining the effects on precautionary saving still requires more research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the puzzling
10If the asset markets are complete, households can be fully insured by trading assets. Consequently,
precautionary saving and insurance will be meaningless. This situation is not consistent with the real world.
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empirical findings. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 provides an intuition to
show the mechanism that can lead to the puzzling household insurance-saving patterns.
Section 5 presents specifications of the model, calibration of the parameters, and mea-
surement of the shocks. The quantitative analysis is provided in Section 6. Section 7
discusses the implication of this model for empirical studies on precautionary saving.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Some Puzzling Features of Health Insurance Coverage and
Household Asset Holdings
Starr-McCluer (1996) studies the impact of private health insurance on household sav-
ings in the US working age population and uses the results to test the precautionary
saving hypothesis. She finds that households that are covered by private health insur-
ance maintain much higher assets than those comparable households without coverage,
contrary to what the precautionary saving hypothesis predicts.
Table 1 shows the ratios of median asset holdings (ain/aun) calculated from Starr-
McCluer’s report (the original source is the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF)).
The asset holding ration is defined as the median of insured households’ asset hold-
ings (ain) divided by the median of uninsured households’ asset holdings (aun). A ra-
tio greater than 1 implies that the insured hold more assets than the uninsured. There
are three measures of assets considered: “liquid assets,” “financial assets” and “net
worth.”11 We can see that most figures are greater than 1, which represents a positive
correlation between health insurance coverage and asset holdings, regardless of which
measure of assets is used. We can also observe that the ratio decreases with increased
income level, regardless of the measures used, which implies that the difference between
higher income insured and uninsured households is smaller.12
Descriptive statistics are not sufficient to show the true saving effect of health insur-
ance. That being so, Starr-McCluer also applies econometric methods, the ordinary least
squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood selection models, to control for other household
11In Starr-McCluer (1996), the first “liquid assets” refers to assets that can be rapidly converted into
cash, including checking accounts, money market deposit accounts, saving accounts, certificates of deposit,
and savings bonds. The second “financial assets” includes liquid assets plus stocks, bonds, mutual funds,
Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh accounts, defined contribution pension plans, trusts, and cash value
of life insurance. The “net worth” is defined as the total value of the household’s assets minus its total
liabilities. Please see Starr-McCluer (1996) for the detailed discussion of these three measures.
12The income groups in the table are classified by current income. Hence, the income groups in the table
might not represent permanent income levels precisely. Even so, the information provided by this table still
shows the pattern of asset holdings across income levels.
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Table 1: Ratio of median asset holdings of the insured to the uninsured
Ratio of median asset holdings (ain/aun)
Income Percent of Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
Groups Households (Liquid assets) (Financial assets) (Net worth)
Below $15K 24.0 ∞ ∞ 41.07
$15-30K 25.4 6.00 11.33 7.15
$30-50K 25.6 2.95 9.46 6.47
Above $50K 25.0 1.39 4.72 0.89
Source: Starr-McCluer (1996); original source: SCF (1989), weighted under-65 sample.
“Liquid assets,” “financial assets” and “net worth” are three measures of assets.
The ratio (ain/aun)> 1 implies that the insured hold more assets than the uninsured.
The median asset holdings of uninsured households is zero in the bottom income group in the
first two columns.
characteristics and selectivity.13 The results still show that health insurance has a signifi-
cant and positive effect on savings. Table 2 shows part of the empirical results presented
in her paper. We can see that the coefficients of health insurance coverage (HI coverage)
are significant positive for all three measures of assets.
Guariglia and Rossi (2004) also study the effects of private medical insurance on
household savings, but use the British Household Panel Survey data. Their findings
are similar to those of Starr-McCluer’s findings: health insurance coverage increases
the probability of saving.14 On the basis of these empirical findings, they suggest that
British households do not have precautionary savings for health risk, and that selectivity
is not the reason for these puzzling empirical results. Although Guariglia and Rossi have
the results similar to Starr-McCluer’s, The UK health insurance environment is largely
different from the US. The National Health Service (NHS) is the dominant provider of
health care in the UK, with universal provision that is generally free at source. The
private insurance is just supplementary. In the US, the private health insurance is dom-
inant and many Americans are uninsured. This paper focuses on the US environment
and Starr-Maclure’s study. The analysis provided in this paper might not be directly
applicable to the UK’s case.
13In order to control for selectivity, she uses a maximum likelihood selection model in which she simul-
taneously estimates the insurance coverage and the saving equations.
14Because the survey only asks households if they save, a yes-or-no question, actual values of the house-
holds’ savings were not obtained.
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Table 2: Regression of log asset holdings - selected variables
Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
Variables / Assets (Liquid assets) (Financial assets) (Net worth)
HI coverage 2.66* 2.97* 1.72*
(0.18) (0.16) (0.19)
Perm’t Income 1.53* 1.71* 1.69*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15)
Health problems -0.34* -0.28* -0.41*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Source: Starr-McCluer (1996), page 290. Only selected variables are reported here.
*Significant at the 5% level.
There are no further analyses of the puzzling saving patterns – the asset holding
ratio is greater than 1 and decreasing with increased income. The main reason for this
phenomenon is still an open question.
3 The Model
I undertake a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that incorporates
two institutions: an asset-based means-tested social welfare system and an employment-
based health insurance system.15
3.1 Household Heterogeneity
The model economy is populated by a large number of infinitely-lived risk-averse house-
holds (with measure one) that have identical preferences and risk aversion. Households
are endowed with different labor efficiency λ , which is given in the beginning of the
lifetime from a finite set Λ = {λ1,λ2, ...λJ} and lasts forever. The wage rate is given by
wλ l, where w is the market wage and l is labor endowment. The efficiency λ therefore
15Households’ saving decisions will affect capital supply and then affect the interest rate and wage rate.
Given that this is so, I use a general equilibrium approach, which will facilitate an understanding of the
whole structure of the economy. The equilibrium interest rate and wage rate are determined by capital
demand (firms) and capital supply (households). In addition, as discussed in Aiyagari (1994), in a partial
equilibrium analysis, by choosing an interest rate close enough to the rate of time preference, one can
generate arbitrary large precautionary saving. This is another reason for using a general equilibrium analysis
in this paper.
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determines households’ permanent income levels. Within a permanent income group,
households are identical ex ante but will be also heterogeneous after shocks are realized.
3.2 Shocks
All households face idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks l (equivalently, income shocks)
and medical expenditure shocks x every period. Labor supply is assumed inelastic and
so an agent will supply its full l, which takes a value from a finite set L = {l1, l2 ...ln}
every period and evolves according to a first-order Markov process with transition prob-
ability matrix pil and an invariant distribution pil . The medical expenditure shock x takes
a value from X = {x1,x2 ...xm} and also follows a finite-state first-order Markov process
with with transition probability matrix pix and an invariant distribution pix.
Since the asset markets are incomplete, households will save in a precautionary
manner to guard against the uncertainty.
3.3 Social Welfare System
There exists an asset-based means-tested social welfare system that enables households
to maintain a minimum consumption level (denoted by C). I employ a simple rule
for the operation of the social welfare system similar to that used by Hubbard et al.
(1995): if a household’s disposable income and assets (denoted by H) are lower than C,
the household qualifies and will receive the social-welfare benefits (a transfer payment
guaranteeing that households can have at least C to spend). As introduced in Hubbard et
al. (1995), this simple social welfare system is used to characterize the social programs
with means tests and asset restrictions in the US, such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and food stamps.
3.4 Production
On the production side, there is a single firm with a production technology that displays
constant returns to scale (CRS).16 The firm hires labor and rents capital from households.
To have permanent income groups, it is assumed that households have different values
of labor efficiency, λ , and that only effective labor (λ l) is productive. There is no
uncertainty in production. Let Y denote the total output and K, N denote the aggregate
capital and aggregate effective labor, respectively. The total output production function
is defined asY = F(K,N). This CRS production function has standard properties: FK >
16As described in Hansen (1985), this setting implies that the firm makes zero profit in the equilibrium.
The economy would behave as it would if there were many competitive firms.
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0, FKK < 0; FN > 0, FNN < 0; FKN > 0, and F(0, N)= F(K, 0)=0. From the first-order
necessary conditions, the rental rate of capital (γ) will equal the marginal product of
capital and the wage rate w for per effective labor will equal the marginal product of
effective labor:
γ = FK(Kt ,Nt); (1)
w = FN(Kt ,Nt). (2)
Capital depreciates at rate δ every period.
3.5 Government and Insurance Companies
In this economy, the government operates the social welfare system. It taxes households’
labor income with a flat rate τ to finance the social welfare system. Since the supply of
labor is inelastic in the model economy, this tax does not affect the supply of labor and
will distort households’ saving decisions less.17 The government is required to have a
balanced budget every period.
Because the structure of the health insurance market is not the focus of this paper,
I assume that insurance market is competitive and insurance companies all provide the
same EHI plan that covers a fraction α of medical expenditure x. The group insurance
premium (q) is determined competitively so that the zero-profit constraint is satisfied.
3.6 Health Insurance System
3.6.1 Baseline – Permeant difference in health insurance status
In addition to saving, households can have health insurance against medical expenditure
shocks. The baseline of this study is to investigate the difference in saving behavior
between the insured and the uninsured. I first consider a simple economy, in which
each agent’s health insurance status is determined in the beginning of the life and lasts
forever. The insurance status does not evolves with the labor status, and therefore has
permanent difference among households – the insured and the uninsured.
3.6.2 Employment-based Health Insurance
The major private health insurance in the US is employment-based health insurance
(EHI). Under EHI, the insurance coverage status is not time invariant. To simply cap-
ture the EHI system, I assume that an agent will be insured under a private plan only if
17If the government taxes capital income, it will distort the asset prices directly and affect the decisions
of asset holding and consumption.
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the employer offers health insurance, which by regulation cannot have any price discrim-
ination, and that the probability of receiving the offer is contingent on work status and
permanent income level. This setting simply reflects the fact that about 90% of private
health insurance is employment-based in the US. The EHI covers a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of
the medical expenditure. If an agent is covered by the EHI, she only pays (1−α)x out
of her pocket for but needs to pay premium q.
Let an indicator iEHI denote the status of the offer of EHI. An agent is offered the
insurance if iEHI = 1, and is not if iEHI = 0. The probability of receiving the offer de-
pends on the agent’s work status and permanent income level (i.e. labor endowment
status l and efficiency λ , in the model): the probability of being insured is higher when
a household has a better labor endowment status, which represents a better job posi-
tion, and a higher skill level (Prob(iEHI = 1|li, λ ) > Prob(iEHI = 1|l j, λ ) if li > l j;
Prob(iEHI = 1|l, λi)> Prob(iEHI = 1|l, λ j) if λi > λ j).18
3.7 Household Problem
The state vector of an agent is given by s = (a, l,x, iEHI ,λ ), where a denotes asset hold-
ings, l the idiosyncratic labor endowment shock, x the idiosyncratic medical expenditure
shock, iEHI the indicator for the availability of the (employed-based) health insurance
offer, and λ the time invariant labor efficiency level. Agents observe the state s at the
beginning of a period and choose consumption level (c) and asset holdings (a′) to max-
imize their expected value. Together with allocation decision a′, s′ = (a′, l′,x′, i′EHI,λ ′)
form next period’s state.19 The agent’s problem can be expressed in the following re-
cursive form.
18As mentioned in Section 1, the price difference in the group and non-group health insurance markets
generates the difference in accessing health insurance. Therefore, for simplicity, the decision process of
accessing health insurance is simplified to a probability contingent on work status. However, adding the
decision process into the model will not change the analysis and results of this paper. Given that every
household has the same preference and risk aversion, if we allow households to choose whether they pur-
chase health insurance or not, the decision will depend strongly on whether they are offered employment-
based health insurance. If they are offered it, most of them will accept it because of the reasonable premium
of employment-based health insurance; if they are not offered it, many of them will not purchase health
insurance because individual insurance plans are much more expensive. Hence, the distribution of health
insurance coverage with decision process will be consistent with that in this simplified model. Given that
the focus of this paper is on the effects of insurance on saving rather than analyzing insurance purchase de-
cisions or insurance market structure, adding the decision process would make the model more complicated
without adding too much accuracy to the results.
19Note that λ ′ = λ . λ is determined at the beginning of life and fixed forever.
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c+a′ = H +T R; (4)
H ≡ (1− τ)wλ l+(1+ r)a− (1− iEHI ·α)x− iEHI ·q (5)
T R = max{0, C−H} (6)
c≥ 0; a′ ≥−b; (7)
In (3), V (s) is the value function given the current state s. In order to character-
ize a risk-averse household, the period utility function, U(c), is assumed with standard
properties, such as strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable (i.e.
U ′(c) > 0, U ′′(c) < 0), limc→0U ′(c) = −∞ (for interior solution), and U ′′′(c) > 0 (for
precautionary saving).20 E is the expectation operator, which is conditional on informa-
tion at current period and β is the utility discount factor.
Equation (4) indicates the period budget constraint. The left hand side (LHS) of (1b)
indicates that household can spend the money on consumption (c) and asset holdings
(a′). The right hand side (RHS) of (1b) is household i’s disposable income and assets H
plus social welfare transfer T R.
As described in (5), H is a household’s disposable income plus assets (net after the
necessary medical expenditure). Given the wage rate per efficiency labor unit w and
rate of return of assets rt , the household receives after-tax (with tax rate τ) labor income
(1− τ)wλ l and previous assets plus asset return (1+ r)a (a is the assets held from last
period). In addition, it is assumed that medical expenditure x is required only to offset
the damage brought on by poor health or illness; no utility is delivered from medical
expenses. The out-of-pocket medical expenditure is (1−α)x for an insured household
(i.e. iEHI = 1), and q is the premium paid to an insurance company. The uninsured have
to pay full medical charge x.
The household may also receive T R, which is the transfer payment from the so-
cial welfare program. Equation (6) describes the transfer function of the social welfare
20In a partial-equilibrium saving problem, it has been known since Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) that
precautionary saving in response to risk is associated with a positive third derivative of the utility function,
but in a general equilibrium environment, the positive-third-derivative assumption is not necessary (see the
discussion in Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000). However, I still use the stronger third-derivative assumption
for precautionary saving because the goal of this paper is to show that, even when households do have
precautionary motives, we are still able to observe a positive correlation between health insurance coverage
and savings.
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system. I consider a simple transfer rule proposed by Hubbard et al. (1995). C is the
minimum level of consumption supported by government or society. Transfer T R will
be made if H is smaller than C, and the transfer amount will be equal to C minus H.21
In the economy, households are liquidity constrained. (7) indicates that households
can only borrow by a limited amount, b, and therefore cannot fully insure their con-
sumption through asset trading.
3.8 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let s ≡ (a, l,x, iEHI,λ ) denote the household state vector. Given the health insurance
coverage parameter {α} and the institution parameter {C}, a stationary recursive com-
petitive equilibrium consists of factor prices {w,r}, a set of household decision rules
{a′,c} for each state s, a value function V (s), firm choices {K,N}, insurance premium
{q}, the social welfare transfer function Tr(s), tax rate τ , and distribution of households
over the state space ψ(s) that satisfy the following conditions:
1) Given the factor prices, the decision rules of a′ and c solve household’s problem;
2) The factor prices are determined competitively: w = FN(K,N) and r = FK(K,N)−
δ = γ−δ ;
3) τ satisfies the government’s budget constraint:∫
Tr(s)ψ(s)ds =
∫
(τ ·w · z · l)ψ(s)ds (8)
4) Health insurance premium q is determined so that the zero-profit condition for in-
surance companies is satisfied:∫
q · iEHIψ(s)ds =
∫
α · x · iEHIψ(s)ds (9)
5) All markets clear:
N =
∫




6) The aggregate resource constraint is satisfied:
Y =C+X +K′− (1−δ )K; (12)









In the steady state equilibrium, K′− (1−δ )K = δK.
In the general equilibrium model, the capital demand (from the firm) and the capital
supply (i.e. the asset demand from households) determine the equilibrium interest rate
r . Given that there are no aggregate shocks on either demand side or supply side, there
will exist an unique steady-state equilibrium r.
4 The Factors that Affect Household Saving Behavior
There is no simple closed-form solution for the above stochastic dynamic programming
problem; hence, I will solve the model numerically and perform a quantitative analysis.
Before that, I offer an intuition of the effects of the social welfare system and health
insurance on household asset holdings. This will also illustrate the mechanism that can
lead to the puzzling insurance-saving phenomenon.
4.1 Effects of the Social Welfare System
The asset-based means-tested social welfare system has a negative effect on saving. The
magnitude of this effect decreases as the income level increases.
1) The asset-based means-tested social welfare system decreases savings.
As discussed in Hubbard et al. (1995), there are two channels through which the
social welfare system can decrease household asset holdings. The first channel is the
reduction of uncertainty with respect to income and expenditure. The social welfare sys-
tem guarantees that the household disposable resources will never fall below C; hence,
the uncertainty is reduced and households can maintain less precautionary savings.
The second channel comes from the asset-based means test. This test creates an
incentive for households to reduce savings and increase consumption in order to receive
social welfare benefits. Meanwhile, the expected return of asset holdings is also reduced
by the means test of the social welfare system. This is because once households qualify
for the social welfare programs, their disposable resources H will be subsidized to the
same level C, which implies that previous savings are not helpful for those qualified
households. As long as there exists some probability that a household will qualify, even
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if it does not currently qualify, the household will have less incentive to maintain their
savings.
2) The negative effect on savings decreases with increased permanent income level.
Households with higher permanent income (i.e. a greater λ ) are better able to resist
uncertainty and obviously have a lower probability of qualifying for the social welfare
programs. Therefore, they are less affected by the social welfare system. In addition,
higher-income households have higher expected consumption/utility in good states than
lower-income households. The social programs cannot greatly reduce their consump-
tion/utility gap between good states and bad states (relative to lower-income house-
holds), and so these households have a greater incentive to save in order to smooth their
consumption. Both factors lead to the conclusion that the social welfare system has a
smaller (negative) saving effect on higher-income households.
Another reason for less negative saving effect on higher-income households is that,
in the general equilibrium environment, when households all drop their asset holdings
(because of the effects of the social welfare system), the rate of return of assets r is
driven up. Households will respond by increasing some asset holdings. If the marginal
utility is convex, as is the widely used constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility,
higher-income households are more sensitive to r changes and will increase their asset
holdings more than those with lower income in response to an increase in the rate of
return r.22
4.2 Effects of Health Insurance on Saving under the Social Welfare System
Here, I explain the effects of health insurance on saving in an economy that has the
means-tested social welfare system discussed above. The interaction between health
insurance and the social welfare system provides one mechanism that is responsible for
the puzzling insurance-saving pattern observed in the US.23
1) Positive effects: reducing the negative effects of the social welfare system on
savings.
The introduction of health insurance reduces the negative saving effects of the social
welfare system in the following two ways.
First, health insurance reduces the fluctuation of disposable income and assets caused
by medical expenditure shocks, and then reduces the probability of qualifying for the
social welfare benefits. This leads to an increase in the expected marginal return of asset
22That property can be represented by U ′′′(c)> 0.
23Another mechanism is the employment-based (work-contingent) health insurance system. See further
discussion of this below.
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holdings, as well as a greater incentive to hold assets, other things being equal.
In addition, health insurance increases the expected utility when households do not
qualify for social welfare benefits (denoted by “good states”), but has no effect when
households do qualify for social benefits (bad states) because households’ disposable
wealth is fixed at C and therefore no uncertainty exists. This enlarges the expected
consumption/utility gap between good states and bad states, and increases the expected
return of asset holdings that encourages insured households to save.
In general, the introduction of health insurance allows households to rely less on the
social welfare system and thereby reintroduces an incentive to save.
2) Negative effects: decreasing precautionary savings.
The insurance effects still exists: a reduction in income and expenditure fluctuations,
and consequently reduced precautionary savings. Therefore, the net effect on saving is
ambiguous.
3) The net effect of health insurance depends on the size of the means-tested social
welfare system.
Given that the positive saving effect of health insurance results from the reduction
of the negative effects of the social welfare system, the size of the social welfare system
affects how large the positive effect will be and consequently determines the net saving
effect of health insurance.
In the model economy, the means test criterion C represents the size of the social
welfare system. If C is set lower than the minimum of household disposable income,
denoted by H, the social welfare system will not have any effect on households. The
only effect of health insurance is a reduction in savings, as in a standard precautionary
saving model without the social welfare system.
When C is set higher than H, the social welfare system will affect household sav-
ings. Introducing health insurance will reduce the (negative) saving effects generated
by the social welfare system and will thereby have positive effects on savings. Within
a reasonable range, a higher C implies a larger reduction that health insurance can have
on the saving effects generated by the social welfare system, and so the positive saving
effect that health insurance will have increases.24 I show in the quantitative analysis that
when C is set high enough, the positive effect on saving will exceed the negative effect.
In addition, as mentioned above, the negative effect on saving of the social welfare
system decreases as the level of a household’s income increases; therefore, the positive
effect on saving of health insurance also decreases as the level of a household’s income
24If C is set very high (the extreme case is C equal to average income), insured households will also have
a very high probability of qualifying for social welfare benefits. Then the positive effect of health insurance
on saving will decrease.
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increases. This results in there being a smaller difference in the assets held by the insured
and the uninsured (i.e. a smaller asset holding ratio, ain/aun) in higher income groups,
in agreement with the pattern we observe in the data (see Table 1).
4.3 The Role of the Employment-Based (Work-Contingent) Health Insur-
ance System
In the foregoing, we discussed how the introduction of health insurance affects house-
hold asset-holding behavior, without any specification of what makes a household eligi-
ble for health insurance. If the health insurance system is employment-based, currently
insured households will still have the incentive to save for future possible bad times
without insurance coverage, because health insurance coverage is also uncertain and is
usually accompanied by good labor states (representing full-time and good job posi-
tions). Thus, this work-contingent health insurance system reinforces the incentive for
insured households to save in an economy that has a means-tested social welfare system.
5 Model Specification and Calibration
To solve the model numerically and provide an adequate quantitative analysis, I begin
by providing the specification and parameterization of the model.
5.1 Preference and production
The model period is set at one year. A widely-used constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function is used to characterize household preference:
U(c) = (c1−µ)/(1−µ). (15)
It is also assumed that every household has identical preferences, so that the analysis
and results do not depend on heterogeneity of preference. The relative risk aversion co-
efficient (µ) in the utility function is set at 3, which, as Hubbard et al. (1995) suggested,
is consistent with many empirical studies. Nevertheless, other possible values of µ will
also be tested to ensure the robustness of the results. The utility discount factor (β )
is chosen to be 0.91 so that the capital output ratio in the benchmark model economy
roughly equals 3.
The production function is taken to be a standard Cobb-Douglas type:
F(K,N) = AKθ N1−θ . (16)
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The TFP, A, is set at unity, because I focus on a detrended economy without production
uncertainty, as in Aiyagari (1994). The capital share θ is taken to be 0.36, and as
suggested by Stokey and Rebelo (1995), the depreciation rate of capital δ is set at 0.06.
The above specifications and parameter values are chosen in order to be consistent with
aggregate features of the postwar US economy and are commonly employed in models
of growth and real business cycles.
5.2 Labor endowment shock and labor efficiency
In the model, the idiosyncratic labor endowment shock l is used to capture the income
fluctuations and the labor efficiency λ determines the permanent income level. Previ-
ous studies suggest that a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process can well approxi-
mate the pattern of the logarithm of labor endowment shocks (or equivalently, income
shocks).25 The process is set as
log(lt+1) = ρl log(lt)+ εlt , (17)
where ρl is the serial correlation coefficient of labor endowment shocks and εlt is white
noise.
The specification and parameterization for this AR(1) process are based on the re-
sults reported in Hubbard et al. (1995). Their estimation of income shock, which in-
cludes unemployment insurance benefits and the subtracting of taxes, and which is based
on micro data, better fits our model. They estimate the income-shock processes for three
educational categories separately. Their results indicate that the values of persistence,
ρl , are quite similar among the three educational groups; the values range from 0.946
to 0.955. In addition, they find that the variance of εlt decreases as the level of edu-
cation decreases, from 0.033 to 0.016. Using their estimations as a basis, ρl is set at
0.955 and the variance of εlt is set at 0.025, as in the middle-education group for the
idiosyncratic labor endowment shock. I then apply the procedure described in Tauchen
(1986) to approximate this AR(1) process using a five-state Markov chain, with a maxi-
mum and minimum equal to plus and minus 2.5 standard deviations of the unconditional
distribution.
In order to examine the differences among income groups, from the bottom to the
top income level I set four permanent income groups with equal weights, which can be
compared with the US data shown in Table 1.26 The labor efficiency λ is chosen to be
2.10, 1.00, 0.62 and 0.28 for the four permanent-income groups from top to bottom so
25See, for example, Aiyagari (1994) and Hubbard et al. (1995)
26The income groups in Table 1 are defined by current income, because it is not easy to get true permanent
income from the cross-section data. However, each income group includes a range of incomes that can
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Table 3: States of medical expenditure
Expenditure Average Exp. % of Average
State Range ($ in 1996) Income (1996)
Low bottom 70% 250 1%
Fair 70 – 95% 3,099 12%
High 95 – 99% 16,173 65%
Very High top 1% 73,197 293%
Source: MEPS, 1996.
that in the equilibrium of the benchmark (fully-specified) economy the mean household
income are consistent with the data in 1989 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey).27
5.3 Medical expenditure shock
To characterize medical expenditure shock, I calibrate a Markov process directly from
the data instead of estimating an AR(1) process, as in some previous studies.28 The
principal reason is that the distribution of medical expenditure is very skewed and clearly
not symmetric: 70% of the working-age population spent only $250 on health care in
1996, which was equivalent to 1% of the average labor income in 1996. However, the
top 1% of the population spent $73,197, which was 298% of the average labor income.
In addition, the persistence of medical expenditure is not constant in different health
states, but an AR(1) process implies a constant persistence for every state. Therefore,
I use the report of persistence in health care expenditure in Monheit (2003) to identify
the transition probabilities for a four-state Markov chain of medical expenditure.29 The
procedure is described below, the definitions of states are summarized in Table 3, and
the results are reported in Table 4.
I define the four states of medical expenditure shock as “low,” “fair,” “high” and
absorb some current income fluctuation. Therefore, the data may still reflect a pattern in different permanent
income levels.
27The values of mean household income for households in 75-100%, 50-75%, 25-50%, and bottom 25%
are 81858, 39231, 22437, and 8524 dollars in 1989, respectively. The values are calculated by using linear
interpolation on mean household income received by each fifth and top 5 percent from the report of Current
Population Survey.
28For example, Freenberg and Skinner (1994) and Hubbard et al. (1995).
29Monheit uses the data from the 1996/97 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to determine the
persistence and provides a detailed report.
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Table 4: Transition probabilities of X
Low Fair High Very High
Low 0.821 0.158 0.018 0.003
Fair 0.418 0.495 0.069 0.018
High 0.229 0.470 0.237 0.064
Very High 0.138 0.370 0.330 0.162
Note: Identified from Monheit (2003).
“very high.” People who have medical expenditure in the bottom 70% are set in the
state “low,” those in the range from 70 to 95% are set in the state “fair,” those in the
range from 95 to 99% are in the state “high” and the top 1% are in the state “very
high.” In order to reflect the true costs for health care that uninsured households must
face, I use the mean of the total annual costs of health care (including both out-of-pocket
expenditure and insurance payments) in each range to represent the medical expenditure
shock in each state.
As shown in Table 3, among the US working-age population in 1996, the means of
medical costs in the “low,” “ fair,” “high” and “very high” groups were $250, $3,099,
$16,173 and $73,197, which were equivalently 1%, 12%, 65% and 293% of the aver-
age labor income in 1996, respectively (from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,
MEPS). Thus, in the model, the medical expenditures X in the four states are set as the
above percentages of average labor income.
To calibrate the transition probabilities for the Markov chain, I use the data provided
in Monheit (2003). Monheit reports households’ medical-expenditure rank in 1996 and
1997 to study the persistence in medical expenditure. This information allows us to
calculate the transition probabilities for each state from 1996 to 1997. Note that the
data include information for all ages, not only for those of working age. The transi-
tion probabilities might overstate the persistence in high-expenditure states because the
retired population is also included. However, compared with the persistence used in
previous studies for an AR(1) process (see Hubbard et al., 1995, for example), even the
persistence in the highest expenditure state is still lower than theirs.30 The transition
probabilities for the medical expenditure states are listed in Table 4. We can see that the
30Feenberg and Skinner (1994) estimated the persistence coefficient of the medical-expense AR(1) pro-
cess at 0.901, but their sample was on households aged 55 and above. Hubbard et al. (1995) also used
this number (0.901) in their medical-expenditure-shock process. This setting implies that for all medical
expenditure states, the persistence is always 0.901.
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matrix is not symmetric and the persistence is not constant across states.
5.4 The social welfare system
We also need to measure the C or the consumption floor that the government tries to
guarantee, above and beyond medical expenses, through means-tested transfer pay-
ments. As stated in Hubbard et al. (1995), measuring the means-tested consumption
floor is difficult, because potential payments vary dramatically by family features and
even by the recipient’s location (state or city). In this paper, I use the consumption
floor estimated by Hubbard et al. for the value of C, but alternative values will be also
reviewed.
Hubbard et al. make a first approximation by calculating the consumption floor for
representative families based on figures in US House (1991). Their estimate includes
only means-tested transfer payments, such as AFDC, food stamps, and Section 8 hous-
ing assistance for those under age 65. Unemployment insurance is not included because
it is not means-tested, and it is already included in the measure of income.31 Medicaid
is also not included as a part of C because it is used exclusively by the social welfare
system to pay for medical expenses.
Their estimation shows that, for a female-headed family with two dependent chil-
dren and no outside earnings or assets, the median AFDC and food stamp transfers
($5,764) plus expected housing subsidies ($1,173) were $6,937 in 1984. The average
household income was $27,464 in 1984 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Sur-
vey). The amount 6,937 is about 25% of the average household income. However, as
cautioned by Hubbard et al., the benefits might be greatly reduced if the father were
present in the household or were married to the mother, or if the household had fewer
children or grown children. That being so, the benefits might be overestimated for a
normal family (with both father and mother). Therefore, in the benchmark model I set C
as 20% of average household income to represent the size of the social welfare system
in the US, but a wider range from 15% to 25% will also be reviewed for robustness test.
5.5 Employment-based health insurance
The coinsurance/copayment rate (1−α) is set at 20%, which is roughly equal to the
average ratio of out-of-pocket medical expenditure to total medical expenditure in the
population under 65. To characterize employment-based health insurance, I simplify the
feature of accessing private health insurance as a probability contingent on labor endow-
ment status (equivalently, work status): if a person has a lower labor endowment status
31See the calibration of labor endowment shock in section 5.1.2.
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(representing a worse work status) in a time period, that person will have a lower prob-
ability of being covered by employment-based health insurance. I also allow permanent
differences in accessing insurance among the four permanent income groups. Some as-
sumptions and criteria are made to identify the probabilities of accessing private health
insurance with each labor status for each income group. They are: (1) the total number
of uninsured households constitute 20% of the total working age population in equilib-
rium, which is consistent with the US data in 1989; (2) agents in higher income level
(higher λ ) have higher probabilities of accessing insurance – in equilibrium, 10% of the
top income group, 17% of the second income group, 23% of the third income group
and 30% of the bottom group are uninsured, so that 20% are uninsured in total; (3) the
probability of accessing health insurance is increasing with work status (i.e. labor state
l). To ensure the above features, the probabilities of being insured conditional on labor
states for each permanent income group are set as in table 5. This setting indicates a
feature that the distribution of the uninsured over the five labor states are the same for
every income group – 75% of the total uninsured are from the lowest two labor states
that represent unemployment, part-time or bad job positions, and only 5% are from the
top two labor states that represent good job positions. 32
The conditional probabilities in Table 5 means that, for example, for agents in the
top income group, the probability of being insured is 68.3% when agents are in the worst
labor state, 77.5% in the second worst, 94.8% in the median state, 98.1% in the second
best, and 99.2% in the best that generates 10% uninsured agents in this group. Please
see Table 5 for the other groups. 33
6 Quantitative Analyses and Results
This and next sections provide quantitative analyses, which include model economy
simulations and regressions with simulated data. I focus on the features of the steady
state equilibrium, the approximation approach introduced in Aiyagari (1994) is applied
to solve for the equilibrium numerically.
In the following analyses, I simulate each model economy for 100,000 periods and
discard the first 50,000 periods. The remaining observations (50,000 for each income
32The shares of the uninsured of the five labor states, from low to high, are 20%, 55%, 20%, 4.5%, and
0.5%. Note that the stationary distribution of the labor states is not uniform. The stationary distribution of
the five labor states, from low to high, is (0.0630, 0.2447, 0.3846, 0.2447, 0.0630).
33Here I allow that agents in different income groups face different distribution of the probability of
accessing insurance. In the appendix, I use a simple setting assuming that households in every income
group face the same distribution of the probability of being insured. I show that even with the simple
setting, the results of this paper still hold.
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Table 5: Conditional probabilities of accessing insurance Pr(iEHI = 1|l,λ )
Income group Labor states
(λ ) l1 (lowest) l2 l3 l4 l5 (highest)
Bottom 0.0476 0.3257 0.8440 0.9448 0.9762
2nd 0.2698 0.4830 0.8804 0.9577 0.9817
3rd 0.4603 0.6179 0.9116 0.9687 0.9865
Top 0.6825 0.7752 0.9480 0.9816 0.9921
group) are used as cross-sectional data since the stationary time-series distribution is
equivalent to the stationary cross-sectional distribution. Although this paper does not
aim to match the wealth distribution in the US, with the means-tested welfare programs,
the benchmark model economy (in which C equals 20% of average income) can repro-
duce the feature of the lower tail that the bottom 40% households hold less than 1% of
total wealth.
To show the role of each institution clearly, I first examine the difference in saving
behavior between insured and uninsured households in economies with social welfare
systems of different sizes. Then I add the employment-based health insurance system
to the model (the benchmark economy). With this addition, the simulation results are
improved to match the saving pattern observed in the US.
6.1 Baseline Model: Role of the Means-Tested Social Welfare System
In this simpler case, status of health insurance coverage is determined in the beginning
of life and kept constant over time. Two groups of households are compared: households
in one group are covered by health insurance and those in the other group are not. The
employment-based health insurance system is shut down.
6.1.1 Comparison of two economies and the US data
I perform a simulation of two economies: one with a small social welfare system and
the other with a large social welfare system.
For the small social welfare system, C is set to be only 1% of average income (de-
noted by e¯), while in the economy with a large social welfare system, C is set to be 20%
of average income. Table 6 presents the comparison of ratios of median asset holdings
between insured and uninsured households (denoted by ain/aun) in the two economies.
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Table 6: Ratios of median asset holdings (ain/aun)
Baseline Model (Constant HI) US Data*
Income Small social Large social Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
group welfare system welfare system (Liquid) (Financial) (Net worth)
Bottom 0.53 ∞ ∞ ∞ 41.07
2nd 0.38 1.75 6.00 11.33 7.15
3rd 0.37 1.11 2.95 9.46 6.47
Top 0.30 0.88 1.39 4.72 0.89
Notes: (1) The ratio is defined as the median asset holdings of insured households divided by that
of uninsured households. (2) Small social welfare system: C = .01e¯. Large social welfare system:
C = .20e¯. *Calculated from the report in Starr-McCluer (1996). Original source: Survey of Consumer
Finances (1989).
In addition, the ratios calculated with three measures of assets from the US data are
presented, for reference.
The economy with a small social welfare system, which affects households only
slightly, is expected to behave as in a standard precautionary saving model: insured
households hold less assets than those that are uninsured. The simulated results confirm
this expectation (the first column in Table 6). We can clearly observe that the ratios
of median asset holdings in all income groups are less than 1, which implies that the
insured’s median asset holding (ain) is less than the uninsured’s (aun) in each income
group.
The second column presents the median asset holding ratios in the economy with a
large social welfare system. The ratios are greater than 1, except that in the top income
group (which is close to 1). Because the means-tested social welfare system is large (a
greater C), the positive effect of health insurance on saving exceeds the negative effect.
In addition, we can observe that the ratio decreases as the level of permanent income
increases, because the effect of the social welfare system is smaller on the households
that have a higher permanent income. This pattern is also shown in the US data. How-
ever, the magnitude of the ratios in this model economy is less than that in the data.
6.1.2 Is positive insurance-saving correlation puzzling?
To illustrate the role of the means-tested social welfare system, economies with various
sizes of social welfare systems (represented by values of C) are simulated here. I vary
C from 1% to 25% of the average income (denoted by e¯) for this exercise. A higher C
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Table 7: Ratios of median asset holdings (ain/aun) with various values of C
Size of the social welfare system
Income group C = .01e¯ C = .10e¯ C = .15e¯ C = .20e¯ C = .25e¯
Bottom 0.53 2.39 ∞ ∞ ∞
2nd 0.38 1.24 1.54 1.75 1.79
3rd 0.37 0.81 0.87 1.11 1.47
Top 0.30 0.68 0.76 0.88 0.95
Note: The value of C represents the size of the social welfare system.
means that the economy provides more protection for households’ income and expen-
diture uncertainty, and also implies a higher probability that households will qualify for
social welfare benefits.
Table 7 presents the simulation results and shows the pattern that we expect: as C
increases, the insured households tend to hold more assets than the uninsured so that the
median asset holding ratios increase, and the ratios tend to be greater than 1 when C is
high.
Therefore, in an economy with a means-tested social welfare system, the existence
of a motive for precautionary saving does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that
insured households should hold less assets than the uninsured even when there is no
selection problem.
6.2 Model with Employment-Based Health Insurance System (Full Speci-
fication)
Now I examine a model economy with both a social welfare system and an employment-
based health insurance system, as in the US. To be comparable with the previous case,
two economies with small and large social welfare systems are also simulated. Table
8 reports the results. The first column in the table shows the median asset holding
ratios (ain/aun) generated from the economy with a small social welfare system (where
C = .01e¯). The ratios are greater than 1 in all permanent income groups, even with such
a low C, but the magnitude is still smaller than the data. The second column presents the
asset holding ratios in the economy with a large social welfare system (where C= .20e¯).
These ratios are enlarged and closer to the US data. In addition, the pattern that the asset
holding ratio decreases as income level increases still holds here.
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Table 8: Ratios of median asset holdings (ain/aun)
Model (Employment-based HI) US Data*
Income Small social Large social Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
group welfare system welfare system (Liquid) (Financial) (Net worth)
Bottom 1.45 ∞ ∞ ∞ 41.07
2nd 1.14 17.68 6.00 11.33 7.15
3rd 1.13 3.61 2.95 9.46 6.47
Top 1.07 1.84 1.39 4.72 0.89
Notes: Small social welfare system: C = .01e¯. Large social welfare system: C = .20e¯.
*Calculated from the report in Starr-McCluer (1996) with three measures of assets.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In the above simulations, the risk aversion coefficient (µ) of the CRRA utility function
is set at 3, as is suggested by many empirical studies. In order to show the robustness
of the results, I provide a sensitivity test for alternative values of risk aversion µ . The
results are reported in Table 9. We can see that the pattern of asset holding ratios still
holds under each alternative value of µ (from 2 to 5).
I also perform a sensitivity test for a range of reasonable social welfare sizes. The
values of C from 15% to 25% of the average household income are tested. Table 10
presents the results. We can see that the pattern of asset holding ratios under each value
of C still holds.
6.4 Discussion: Why and When is the Standard Model Invalid?
According to the above quantitative analysis, the negative correlation between insurance
and savings that is standardly expected can be observed only when the size of the social
welfare system is small and the health insurance coverage is stable. Otherwise, we are
likely to observe a positive correlation between health insurance coverage and savings,
as seen in the case of the US. Moreover, this positive correlation does not necessarily
imply the nonexistence of precautionary saving.
There are at least two assumptions that guarantee the validity of the standard model:
(1) no other factors that affect saving decisions vary with the insurance coverage; and (2)
the insurance coverage is constant (i.e. there is no uncertainty of insurance coverage). In
this paper, the existence of the means-tested social welfare system and the employment-
based health insurance system violates these two assumptions.
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Table 9: Sensitivity Test – Risk Aversion (µ)
Ratios of median asset holdings (ain/aun)
Income group µ = 2 µ = 3 µ = 4 µ = 5
Bottom ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
2nd 17.76 17.68 63.54 79.53
3rd 2.73 3.61 4.57 4.24
Top 1.57 1.84 2.05 1.96
Note: C = .20e¯ (large social welfare system).
Table 10: Sensitivity Test – size of the social welfare system (C)
Ratios of median asset holdings
Income group C = .15e¯ C = .20e¯ C = .25e¯
Bottom ∞ ∞ ∞
2nd 4.39 17.68 158.71
3rd 2.47 3.61 5.95
Top 1.85 1.84 1.80
Note: risk aversion µ = 3.
With the means-tested social welfare system, health insurance not only decreases
precautionary savings, but also reduces the effects of the social welfare system on sav-
ing. This violates the first assumption. With the employment-based health insurance,
households that are currently in good employment states with insurance coverage will
save for possible bad times in the future when they will not have insurance coverage.
Therefore, in a real-world economy (for example, that of the US), it is likely that
a positive correlation between insurance and savings correlation indicates that some
assumptions behind the standard model do not hold, rather than implies the nonexistence
of precautionary saving.
7 Implications for Empirical Testing
Empirical studies also use econometric methods that control for other characteristics in
order to analyze more precisely the effect of health insurance on savings and test the
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precautionary saving hypothesis. I also perform a econometric analysis in the model
economy. The “empirical” results from the model economy are consistent with the ex-
isting empirical findings, but the interpretation of the results based on this model differs
greatly from the interpretation based on the standard precautionary saving model. More-
over, I will discuss the implications of this model for the assessment of the empirical
approaches to testing the precautionary saving hypothesis.
7.1 Econometric Method and Regression Results
I use the data generated from simulation of the model to perform an econometric analy-
sis. The model that has a means-tested social welfare system and a employment-based
health insurance system (C = .20e¯ and risk aversion µ = 3) is used to represent the US
economy. In the model economy, by construction, every household has identical risk
aversion and a motivation for precautionary saving. Therefore, an appropriate regres-
sion model should determine correctly the existence of precautionary saving.
The regression model based on the standard precautionary saving model is set as
follows:
log(ai,t) = αHIi,t +β ′Qi,t + εi,t , (12)
where ai,t is household i’s asset holdings at time t, HIi,t is a dummy variable of health
insurance coverage, and Qi,t is a vector of variables, which control for all other directly
observable household characteristics that also affect saving.34 According to the standard
precautionary saving model, we would interpret a negative coefficient of HI (i.e. α < 0)
as verification of the existence of precautionary saving. By the same logic, a positive
coefficient would be interpreted as rejection of the existence of precautionary saving.
Using this kind of regression model as a basis, Starr-McCluer (1996) estimated the
above asset holding equation (12) by controlling for estimated permanent income, health
problems, and other household characteristics as independent variables in Qi,t , and re-
ported a significant positive coefficient of HI using US cross-section data for the work-
ing age population. Starr-McCluer also made a great effort to control for selectivity, and
suggested that selectivity cannot explain the puzzling empirical findings.
Here I follow Starr-McCluer’s basic approach.Because the model environment is
much simpler than the real world, I only need to control for permanent income level
and medical expenditure shock as household characteristics. The regression results are
reported in Table 11. For comparison, the results in Starr-McCluer (1996) are also
34See the control variables used in Starr-McCluer (1996) for example.
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Table 11: Comparison of results of regressions
Starr-McCluer (1996)
Explanatory Model Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
Variable Economy (Liquid) (Financial) (Net worth)
HI coverage 2.08 2.66 2.97 1.72
(0.028) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19)
Perm’t Income 4.22 1.53 1.71 1.69
(0.015) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15)
Medical Shock -0.17 -0.34 -0.28 -0.41
(0.022) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Notes: (1) Social welfare system: C = .20e¯. Risk aversion coefficient: µ = 3.
(2) “Medical Shock” is represented by medical expenditure in the model,
and by illness status in Starr-McCluer (1996).
(3) All coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
presented in the table.35 The first column of the table presents the ordinary least square
regression results using data from the simulated model economy. The coefficient of
health insurance coverage in the model economy is significant positive and consistent
with Starr-McCluer’s findings.
7.2 Interpretation and Implications for Empirical Testing
Given the conventional interpretation, a significant and positive coefficient of health
insurance in the above regression would lead to a rejection of the existence of precau-
tionary saving. However, this interpretation is not always correct. As shown by the
above exercise, the regression model is unable to determine correctly the existence of
precautionary saving in an economy with a means-tested social welfare system and a
employment-based health insurance system. The reason is that the regression model
can only capture the net saving effect of health insurance, rather than exclusively the
effect on precautionary saving. In what follows, I diagnose the failings of the standard
regression model and discuss how empirical testing can be improved.
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Table 12: Comparison of regression results - controlling for work status
Model Economy
Explanatory Without controlling Controlling for
Variable for work status work status
HI coverage 2.08 0.63
Permanent Income 4.22 4.40
Medical Expenditure Shock -0.17 -0.17
Work Status 1.85
Notes: (1) Social welfare system: C = .20e¯. Risk aversion coefficient: µ = 3.
(2) All coefficients are significant at 5%.
7.2.1 Potential bias caused by the employment-based health insurance
In an economy with employment-based health insurance, the regression coefficient of
health insurance coverage will be combined with the effect of the incentive of consump-
tion smoothing: people in good times with insurance coverage save for future possible
bad times without coverage. Moreover, insurance coverage that is associated with higher
income (relative to circumstances without insurance) further reduces the negative effect
on saving of the social welfare system and further increases insured households’ savings.
To distinguish the effect of the uncertainty of insurance coverage from the effect of
insurance itself, we need to control for the level of health insurance eligibility. In the
model economy, the insurance eligibility is set as a positive function of the work status,
which is represented by the labor endowment state, and so we can easily control for it
to show the potential difference in the regression results. The comparison of regression
results is presented in Table 12. When controlling for work status (the second column),
the coefficient of health insurance is still positive but becomes smaller. This is because
the change in work status explains some of the positive effect on saving. In addition, the
coefficient of work status is positive, as we would expect.
In practice, it is not easy to measure the insurance eligibility or the work status, and
the effect is even harder to identify when using cross-section data.
7.2.2 Potential bias caused by the social welfare system
In an economy with a means-tested social welfare system, the introduction of health in-
surance will cause two opposing effects on savings. The negative effect is the reduction
35Only variables related to the model are reported.
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Table 13: Comparison of regression results - economy with regime change
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Explanatory Small SW system Large SW system Large SW system
Variables Constant HI Constant HI Employment-based HI
HI coverage -0.84 0.83 2.08
Permanent Income 0.35 4.75 4.22
Medical Shock -0.11 -0.27 -0.17
Notes: (1) Large social welfare system: C = .20e¯. Small social welfare system: C = .01e¯.
(2) Risk aversion coefficient: µ = 3.
(3) All coefficients are significant at 5%.
of precautionary savings as in a standard model, and the positive effect occurs because
of the existence of the social welfare system. However, we can only observe the net
effect in the data. To identify and separate these two combined saving effects through a
regression model is difficult, even in the model economy.
One possible method is that if we can find an economy experiencing regime changes
in its social welfare system and health insurance system, we might be able to iden-
tify these combined effects with the regression model. For example, if the economy’s
regime changes from a small social welfare system (assume C = .01e¯) and constant
health insurance coverage (Regime 1) to a large social welfare system, where C = .20e¯
(Regime 2), and then the health insurance system changes to an employment-based
(work-contingent) health insurance system (Regime 3), with other things being equal,
we will be able to observe that:
(1) in Regime 1, the regression coefficient of health insurance mostly reflects the re-
duction of precautionary savings caused by health insurance, and so it is expected
to be negative;
(2) from Regime 1 to Regime 2, the difference in the regression coefficient of health
insurance is caused by the regime change in the social welfare system (the positive
saving effect of health insurance becomes larger);
(3) from Regime 2 to Regime 3, the difference in the regression coefficient instead
results from the regime change in the health insurance system (the uncertain health
insurance coverage strengthens the positive effect on saving).
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I use the same model to simulate an economy with the above regime changes and
run a regression under each regime to show these effects. The regression results are
listed in Table 13. We can see that, under Regime 1, the coefficient of health insurance
coverage is negative (-0.84). When the economy changes to Regime 2, the coefficient
becomes positive (0.83) because of the regime change in the social welfare system.
When the economy changes to Regime 3, the coefficient becomes larger (2.08) because
of employment-based health insurance.
However, the above approach relies principally on the availability of the data. An-
other approach would be to compare cross-country data, but that would require a careful
study of the institutions in each country, and may require controlling for other country-
specific characteristics. Hence, further research remains to be done if an appropriate
empirical approach to identify those combined effects, as suggested in this paper, is to
be developed.
8 Concluding Remarks
From the vantage point of a standard model of precautionary saving, a puzzling positive
correlation between private health insurance coverage and household asset holdings has
been observed in the US. I suggested that the puzzling finding can be explained by the
existence of two institutions: a sizable asset-based means-tested social welfare system
and an employment-based health insurance system. In order to analyze this issue, I
developed a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that incorporates
these two institutions. I showed that the model can generate a pattern of asset holding
ratios that is consistent with that observed in the US data, i.e. a positive correlation be-
tween insurance and saving and a shrinking difference in asset holdings between insured
and uninsured households as the level of income increases. This result does not depend
on the assumption of heterogeneity of risk aversion (i.e. selectivity).
I point out that the assumptions required by the standard model of precautionary sav-
ing can easily be violated by some institutional factors, such as the social welfare system
and the health insurance system in the US. I have shown that it is only when the means-
tested social welfare system is small and the health insurance coverage is constant that
we observe a negative correlation between insurance coverage and household savings as
the standard precautionary saving model suggests. As also shown in the analysis, health
insurance coverage reduces the negative effect on saving caused by the social welfare
system, and an employment-based health insurance system increases the incentive to
save when insured. This explains the positive correlation observed in the US. In ad-
dition, because the social welfare system has less effect on higher income households,
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the difference in assets held between insured and uninsured households decreases as the
level of income increases.
The findings call into question the appropriateness of the conventional empirical ap-
proaches based on the standard precautionary saving model to testing the precautionary
saving hypothesis. I applied a regression approach, as used in existing empirical stud-
ies, to the model economy. The regression results show a significant positive coefficient
of health insurance coverage in an economy that has the above two institutions, which
confirms the findings of existing empirical studies. However, the positive coefficient
does not imply the nonexistence of precautionary saving. In fact, households do have
a motive to engage in precautionary saving in the model economy. This bias is present
because the regression model captures the net saving effect of health insurance, rather
than exclusively the effect on precautionary savings. In order to test appropriately for
the existence of precautionary saving, it is necessary to control for the effects caused by
these institutional factors. I have discussed some ways in which empirical testing might
be improved. Nevertheless, in practice it is difficult to distinguish the effect on saving
caused by the institutions from the effect of health insurance on precautionary saving.
Further research is required if this difficulty is to be resolved.
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Appendix
A1. Alternative setting of the EHI coverage
In the text I allow households in different income groups face different probabilities of
accessing health insurance. Here I use simpler setting that all household face the same
uncertainty of accessing insurance. The probabilities of receiving private health insur-
ance coverage conditional on labor (work) states, from low to high, are set as 0.3651,
0.5505, 0.8960, 0.9632 and 0.9841 so that the uninsured are 20% of the total households
and the distribution of the uninsured over the five work states is the same as in the text.
All other parameters are kept the same as in the fully-specified model economy with
a sizable social welfare system C¯ = .20e¯. The simulation results of this economy are
presented in Table 14. A regression is also preformed as in the text, and the results
are shown in Table 15. We can observe that this alternative setting does not change the
analysis in the text.
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Table 14: Ratios of median asset holdings (ain/aun)
US Data*
Income Model Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
group Economy (Liquid) (Financial) (Net worth)
Bottom ∞ ∞ ∞ 41.07
2nd 20.38 6.00 11.33 7.15
3rd 2.99 2.95 9.46 6.47
Top 2.03 1.39 4.72 0.89
Notes: The model economy: µ = 3; C = .20e¯. *Calculated from
the report in Starr-McCluer (1996) with three measures of assets.
Table 15: Comparison of results of regressions
Starr-McCluer (1996)
Explanatory Model Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
Variable Economy (Liquid) (Financial) (Net worth)
HI coverage 1.74 2.66 2.97 1.72
(0.028) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19)
Perm’t Income 4.69 1.53 1.71 1.69
(0.015) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15)
Medical Shock -0.17 -0.34 -0.28 -0.41
(0.022) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Notes: (1) “Medical Shock” is represented by medical expenditure in the model,
and by illness status in Starr-McCluer (1996).
(2) All coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
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